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Abstract
Do firearm purchase delay laws reduce aggregate homicide levels? Using variation from a
6-month countrywide gun demand shock in 2012/2013, we show that U.S. states with legis-
lation preventing immediate handgun purchases experienced smaller increases in handgun
sales. Our findings indicate that this is likely driven by comparatively lower purchases
among impulsive consumers. We then demonstrate that states with purchase delays also
witnessed comparatively 2% lower homicide rates during the same period. Further evidence
shows that lower handgun sales coincided primarily with fewer impulsive assaults and
points towards reduced acts of domestic violence.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between firearm ownership and criminal activity has been one of the
most polarizing topics in U.S. politics over the past decades. Supporters of gun rights
often claim that arming citizens will lead to decreases in crime, while supporters of gun
control point to the high numbers of victims from gun-related violence. Fowler et al.
(2015) report that 32,000 Americans are killed and another 67,000 injured by firearms
every year. Based on their calculations, any policy measure effectively reducing these
numbers would thus have the potential for welfare gains of almost $50 billion each year.
Curbing gun violence was also the intention behind many of the 130 gun control policy
measures which have been enacted so far across U.S. states (Siegel et al., 2017).
One group of such policy measures, specifically targeted at preventing impulsive
acts of gun violence, are firearm purchase delay laws. These measures, by now in place
in 15 U.S. states, create a temporal distance between the decision to buy a gun and
its eventual receipt. Delays can last from 2 days up to 6 months and occur through
mandatory waiting periods or bureaucratic hurdles associated with obtaining purchasing
permits. Both measures provide gun buyers with a “cooling-off period” during which
those with short-lived suicidal or homicidal intentions may reconsider their planned
actions (Cook, 1978; Andrés and Hempstead, 2011). Since delay laws should also keep
impulsive consumers without violent intentions from buying guns, they offer a unique
avenue to investigate whether and how prevented firearm purchases by such individuals
translate into reduced gun violence. However, such analysis would require a reasonably
large shift in impulse purchases unrelated to local crime levels.
In this paper, we exploit one of the largest aggregate shocks to U.S. firearm demand
to study the effects of handgun purchase delay laws. In a first step, we show that
the existence of purchase delays led to a relative reduction in handgun sales during
the six months after the 2012 Presidential election and the shooting at Sandy Hook
Elementary School. During this period, fear of more restrictive gun control legislation
and higher perceived need of self-defense capabilities led to record sales of firearms across
the entire United States (Vox, 2016; CNBC, 2012). We use a difference-in-differences
(DiD) framework, comparing handgun sale background checks in states with handgun
purchase delays to states without such delays during the six-month window of increased
firearm demand. Our baseline results indicate that states with purchase delay laws
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witnessed an 7-8% relative decrease in handgun sales. Differences in gun popularity and
other types of firearm legislation cannot explain these results.
Next, we present evidence suggesting that lower purchasing levels were indeed more
likely driven by impulsive buyers. We start by analyzing Google search data and
show that delay laws did not lead to comparatively lower public interest in buying
firearms during the demand shock. Handgun purchase laws thus did not seem to
affect intentions to buy firearms, but only whether consumers’ interest translated into
actual purchases. Using state variation in delay lengths, we also do not observe a
relationship between our estimated effect size and the length of the delay. For deliberate
and exponentially discounting consumers, these should have been positively correlated,
since delays smoothly reduce the discounted net present value of owning a gun. This
discontinuous impact of delay lengths on purchases lends further credibility to the
presence of impulsive consumers.
In the second part of our analysis, we investigate the effect of delay laws on homicides.
Using the same DiD framework, we find that counties in states with purchasing delays
experienced a relative 2% decrease in overall homicide rates during the demand spike,
which is entirely driven by homicides involving handguns. Our baseline estimate implies
that about 200 lives could have been saved in the six-month period alone if handgun
purchase delays had been in place in all U.S. states. An extensive set of robustness
checks shows that our results are specific to the period of the demand hike and not
driven by single states or choice of the sample. Looking into the characteristics of the
additional homicides in states without handgun purchase delays, we find evidence in line
with the notion that gun ownership among impulsive buyers is associated with crimes of
passion.1 For female victims, the evidence points towards instances of domestic violence,
as the majority of additional female homicides occurred inside the victim’s home and
arose from an argument. The affected killings of males occurred mainly outside of their
home but were similarly strongly related to arguments.
This study is related to three important streams of research. First, we add to the
literature investigating the impact of firearm legislation, and in particular purchase
delays, on crime rates. Previous studies found either decreases (Rudolph et al., 2015;
Edwards et al., 2018; Luca, Malhotra, and Poliquin, 2017) or zero effects (Ludwig
1All statements regarding a relative increase in handgun sales and homicides in states without
handgun purchase delays are just the flip side of the relative decrease in handgun sales and homicides
in states with such delays.
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and Cook, 2000) on violent crime or homicides. As the adoption of firearm purchase
delay laws may not be exogenous and law changes can be anticipated by prospective
gun buyers, our paper substantially advances this literature by providing novel and
credible identification through exploiting a sudden and unanticipated demand shock in
conjunction with pre-existing delay laws. We also provide suggestive evidence that our
empirical setup mainly picks up the behavior of impulsive consumers without violent
intentions and offers insights into the types of homicides prevented through purchase
delays.
Second, we contribute to the large literature in economics, criminology and public
health studying the impact of firearm ownership on violent crime.2 The majority of
studies finds a positive relationship (see e.g. Cook and Ludwig, 2006; Duggan, 2001;
Miller, Azrael, and Hemenway, 2002; Miller, Hemenway, and Azrael, 2007; Siegel, Ross,
and King, 2013). Some studies, however, also report no effect (Duggan, Hjalmarsson,
and Jacob, 2011; Moody and Marvell, 2005; Kovandzic, Schaffer, and Kleck, 2013; Lang,
2016). A recent paper by Levine and McKnight (2017) shows with a different identi-
fication strategy that elevated gun exposure after the Sandy Hook shooting translated
into higher rates of firearm-related accidents.3 We confirm the positive link between gun
ownership and homicides found in previous studies but are the first to look specifically
into firearm homicide characteristics and highlight the role of impulsiveness.
Third, our evaluation of gun purchase delay laws contributes to the growing literature
analyzing how policies can mitigate the consequences of behavioral biases (overviews are
provided in Chetty, 2015; Bernheim and Taubinsky, 2018). To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to study impulsive behavior in the context of gun ownership. Few other
studies at the intersection between behavioral economics and economics of crime have
also linked impulsiveness to criminal activity and acts of violence (Dahl and DellaVigna,
2009; Card and Dahl, 2011; Heller et al., 2017). We advance this literature by providing
the first study to establish a link between firearm availability and fatal consequences of
impulsive behavior.
2Due to space constraints we confine ourselves to the most relevant literature. An excellent survey
discussing in particular the early contributions is provided by Hepburn and Hemenway (2004), newer
contributions are discussed by Kleck (2015).
3While gun-related accidents are not at the heart of our paper, supplementary results reported in
the Appendix based on our own identification strategy cannot replicate those findings. Our main results
suggest that the primary detrimental effect of increased gun ownership after the Sandy Hook shooting
was an increase in gun-related homicides.
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides relevant background infor-
mation regarding U.S. gun laws and the gun demand shock we consider. Sections 3
and 4 introduce the data and empirical strategy used in this paper, respectively. Our
first set of results on handgun sales are presented in Section 5. The discussion of delay
laws’ effects on homicide rates and their circumstances follow in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Purchase Delay Laws in the United States
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the fundamen-
tal right of citizens to keep and bear arms. Federal, state and local governments,
however, have enacted laws making it harder and more cumbersome for citizens to
acquire firearms. On the federal level, two important pieces of legislation are the
Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. The Gun
Control Act requires all professional gun dealers to have a Federal Firearms License
(FFL). Only they can engage in inter-state trade of handguns, are granted access to
firearm wholesalers and can receive firearms by mail. The Brady Act of November 1993
mandated background checks for all gun purchases through FFL dealers and imposed
a five-day waiting period to conduct these checks. Upon successful lobbying by the
National Rifle Association (NRA), these waiting periods were set to expire when the
FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) was introduced in
1998. Since then, the NICS handles all background checks related to the sales of firearms.
While there is comparatively little regulation on gun ownership at the federal level,
there is substantial heterogeneity in restrictions imposed by U.S. states.4 Constraints
on private firearm ownership at the state level predominantly attempt to either prohibit
potentially dangerous people such as convicted felons from acquiring guns or restrict the
usefulness of firearms for unlawful purposes independent of the buyer.
In this study, we focus on handguns since these, unlike long guns, have to be
purchased in the state of residence, are a popular choice for self-defense, can be carried
concealed, and are used in homicides substantially more often than long guns (Federal
4Overviews of all current restrictions in the respective states can be found in NRA (2018) and Giffords
Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence (2018).
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Bureau of Investigation, 2016). We utilize two types of delays between the decision to
purchase and the moment the handgun is actually transferred. The first measure are
mandatory waiting periods. While the initial aim of waiting periods in the Brady Act
was to give law enforcement agencies sufficient time to conduct background checks, they
also provide a “cooling-off” period and can therefore help to prevent impulsive acts of
violence (Cook, 1978; Andrés and Hempstead, 2011). In practice, buyers will perform
a purchase (pass a NICS background check and pay for the chosen gun), but can only
receive their handgun after the waiting period has elapsed. The second measure are state
requirements for licenses to lawfully possess or buy a handgun. Due to bureaucratic
hurdles in the licensing process these impose a de-facto waiting time. Prospective
buyers have to request the permit at a local authority (e.g. a sheriff’s office), pass
a NICS background check and pay the associated fee.5 Only after the permit has been
processed and issued, they may proceed to conduct the firearm purchase at their local
dealer (usually without a renewed background check).
In order to accurately determine the presence of delay laws and minimize mis-
classification, we utilize several sources and apply a rigorous coding procedure outlined
with all details and sources in Appendix Section A.1. The final state classification is
reported in Table 1, which shows that during the period of our study, from November
2009 to October 2013, 15 states and the District of Columbia had adopted some form
of delay laws throughout. Nine states (California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia had
imposed mandatory waiting periods on the purchase of handguns.6 Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Nebraska, North Carolina,
and Rhode Island all require a purchasing permit during the period of our study.
Michigan abolished their handgun permit requirement in December 2012 and is thus the
only state switching its delay legislation during our period of study. For the remainder
of this paper, we will refer to a state which implemented a mandatory waiting period,
5Fees can range from $1 plus notary fee in Michigan to $340 in New York City ($100 in the state of
New York). See https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-0048.htm.
6Wisconsin repealed its 48 hour waiting time on handguns only in 2015 and can thus be included in
our analysis.
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Table 1: Handgun waiting periods and handgun purchasing license delay by state as of
November 2012
State AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE FL
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 3
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 0 0 0∗ 0 60∗ 0 0
State GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 14 0 3 0 3 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 20∗ 0 30 0 0 0 0 0
State ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 30† 40 5†§ 0 0 0 0 2
State NV NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 30 0 180 30 0 0 0
State OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VT
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 0∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
State VA WA WV WI WY DC
Mandatory Waiting Period 0 0 0 2¶ 0 10
Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mandatory Waiting Period refers to the legal minimum amount of time (in days) to pass between the purchase
and the receipt of a firearm. If a state has different waiting periods for different types of firearms, the number
refers to the purchase of handguns. Maximum Purchasing Permit Delay refers to the legal maximum time
(in days) which can pass before a permit that will allow the holder to purchase one or more handguns will
be issued or denied. 0 means that no permit is needed or will be issued instantaneously. ∗ Also requires a
safety certificate through completing a safety course lasting only a few hours. † No legally defined maximum
time, inferred from U.S. Department of Justice (2005). § Abolished in December 2012. ¶ Repealed in 2015,
i.e. after the end of the sample period. Sources for each state are reported in Table 10 in Appendix A.1.
required a purchasing permit, or both, according to Table 1 as a Delay state.7 We refer
to all other states as NoDelay states.
2.2 The Firearm Demand Shock of 2012/2013
Our analysis focuses on the firearm demand spike after the re-election of President
Obama in November 2012 and the Sandy Hook shooting in December 2012. We decided
for these two particular events to study the impact of delay laws on gun sales and
homicides for two main reasons: first, these events by then marked the largest hike
in handgun sales since background data was collected in 1999. Such a strong shock
is required in order to detect any statistically significant effects on firearm purchases
and homicides. Secondly, unlike the numerous later shootings that grabbed nationwide
attention, our setup features a pre-treatment period uncontaminated by other events
which is essential to accurately account for the seasonal nature of the data. In the
following, we briefly describe the two events and the firearm demand hike of 2012/2013.
7For purchasing permits, Table 1 states the maximum delay allowed by law. There is no reliable
information on average delays that we are aware of. As we binarize the treatment, averaging would be
inconsequential for our analysis.
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In the Presidential Election on 6 November 2012, President Barack Obama ran for
a second term against Republican candidate Mitt Romney. While Romney took a more
liberal position towards gun rights and was endorsed the NRA, President Obama favored
stricter gun control laws. In October 2012, almost all polls showed the race as within
the margin of error and President Obama’s victory came so unexpected for Romney on
election night that he had apparently not even prepared a concession speech as internal
polls had showed him winning (International Business Times, 2012; Real Clear Politics,
2012; Silver, 2012). Similarly to President Obama’s first election in 2008, gun sales
increased after his re-election but this time with considerably larger magnitude (CNN,
2008; CNN Money, 2012; Depetris-Chauvin, 2015). This was likely because the President
had started to speak more openly about favoring increased gun control measures in the
wake of recent mass shootings, especially the one at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado
in July 2012.
About a month later, on 14 December 2012, then 20-year-old Adam Lanza of New-
town, Connecticut first shot and killed his mother at their home before driving to Sandy
Hook Elementary School. There he shot and killed six adult school employees and 20
students aged six to seven years. Lanza committed suicide shortly after the first law
enforcement officers arrived at the scene. His motives are still not fully understood,
but it has been suggested that he had a history of mental illness (New Yorker, 2014).
The massacre was the deadliest ever U.S. school shooting and the third deadliest mass
shooting in U.S. history at the time. This and the fact that most of the victims were
defenseless children sparked a renewed and unprecedented debate about gun control in
the United States.
A few days after the shooting, President Barack Obama announced that he would
make gun control a central issue of his second term and quickly assembled a gun
violence task force led by Vice President Joe Biden to collect ideas how to curb gun
violence and prevent future mass shootings. The task force presented their suggestions
to President Obama in January 2013, who announced to implement 23 executive actions.
These were aimed at expanding background checks, addressing mental health issues and
insurance coverage of treatment, as well as enhancing safety measures for schools and
law enforcement officers responding to active shooter situations. Additionally, the task











































































Figure 1: NICS background checks
Monthly federal NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2007 and October 2015 in absolute
numbers. The sample encompasses data for all states consistently included in our main specification (see
section 3.1 for details). The light gray area is our sample window, the dark grey area depicts the six months after
the 2012 election and the shooting at Sandy Hook. The red line shows background checks for handguns, the blue
line all other firearm-related background checks, and the black line displays the sum of the two.
Weapons Ban, expanding criminal background checks to private transactions, banning
high capacity magazines, and increasing funds for law enforcement agencies.
The proposals were met by fierce opposition from the NRA and some Republican
legislators. At the end of January 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced a bill to
reinstate the Federal Assault Weapons Ban. While the bill passed the Senate Judiciary
Committee in March 2013, it eventually was struck down on 17 April 2013 by the
Senate 40-60 with all but one Republicans and some Democrats opposing the bill. A
bipartisan bill to be voted on at that same day, introduced by Senators Joe Manchin
and Pat Toomey, aimed at introducing universal background checks, also failed to find
the necessary three-fifths majority with 54-46, leaving federal legislation eventually
unaffected.
Even though no new federal regulations followed, gun sales soared further in the
months after the Sandy Hook shooting. Fear of tougher gun legislation and a higher
perceived need of self-protection drove up sales for both, handguns and rifles (Vox,
2016). While gun sales had surged after every prior mass shooting during the Obama
administration, the surge after the shooting at Sandy Hook was unprecedented. The
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extreme demand shift even created supply problems for some dealers while others were
hoping for sales increases of a magnitude of up to 400% (CNBC, 2012; Huffington Post,
2013). Several executives in the gun industry have stated that they view mass shootings
as a boon to their business, attracting especially first-time gun owners (The Intercept,
2015). In line with these anecdotes, Figure 1 shows a clear spike in gun sales starting in
November/December 2012 after the Presidential election and the Sandy Hook shooting.
While gun sales generally increase at the end of the year, this particular spike is far
more pronounced and prolonged than in the years immediately before and after.
3 Data
3.1 Handgun Purchases
One of the main challenges in our analysis is the absence of a central database of gun own-
ers and firearm sales. To overcome this, researchers have often turned to proxy variables
from surveys, vital statistics, crime data and gun magazine subscriptions. While some
of these indicators performed quite well in cross-sectional estimation, they have been
found unsuitable for tracking gun ownership over time (Kleck, 2004). Since November
1998, Federal law dictates that an electronic NICS background check be carried out
for every firearm transaction through an FFL dealer. This publicly available data has
the advantage of being comparable across time, providing high coverage at monthly
frequency and distinguishes between different types of transactions and firearms.8 The
main variable in the first part of our analysis are NICS background checks for handgun
sales in a given state between November 2010 and October 2013, divided by the 2010
population in 100,000. In order to interpret our results as semi-elasticities and reduce
the influence of outliers while keeping potential zero observations, we apply the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation (arcsinh) instead of taking natural logarithms (Burbidge,
Magee, and Robb, 1988).9
As pointed out in few recent studies, the NICS data also exhibits important draw-
backs (Lang, 2013, 2016; Levine and McKnight, 2017). First, it does not allow any
inference on the stock of firearms and ownership levels, but can only measure flows
8The data can be downloaded at https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/nics firearm checks -
month year by state type.pdf.
9For convenience, we refer to the arcsinh transformation as log throughout the paper. We provide
robustness checks in levels for our main specifications in the Appendix.
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of weapons. Second, these flows might be substantially understated as about 22%
of firearm sales are between private parties and occur in states which do not require
background checks for private transactions (Miller, Hepburn, and Azrael, 2017). Third,
a background check can occur for the purchase of multiple weapons, as well as an
exchange of an old for a new firearm. Fourth, the data does not distinguish between
approved and rejected background checks. Finally, some states require a background
check for a concealed carry permit application but not for a handgun purchase itself.
Other states are running regular or irregular re-checks on permit holders regardless of
guns being bought and thereby inflate the counts or produce outliers.
We believe that our setup mitigates some of these problems. To start with, the
aforementioned anecdotes, as well as findings in Studdert et al. (2017) indicate that
many handgun purchases during the demand shock in late 2012 were made by new gun
owners. With few sales to pre-existing gun owners, this should strengthen the correlation
between handgun sale background checks and changes in firearm ownership. Sales
outside the NICS through private transactions and particularly gun shows are a concern
but would only invalidate our results if they were more common in NoDelay states
during the sales hike. Since many consumers were first-time buyers, we deem it more
likely they were buying from a regular FFL dealer than privately.10 Multiple purchases
are less problematic given our interest in the extensive margin of gun ownership. A
boost in exchanges of old for new guns in Delay states could also overstate increases
in firearm ownership in those states. Since the likelihood of such exchanges should
be correlated with pre-existing levels of gun ownership, we are able to control for
this concern in additional robustness checks. Furthermore, recent work by Mueller
and Frandsen (2017) has shown that only about 1.5% background checks across the
U.S. are actually rejected which severely limits the impact of this potential source of
error. There should also be no reason to believe that the demand shock affected the
rejection probability asymmetrically across Delay and NoDelay states. Finally, we add
background checks for permits to our measure of handgun sales to capture cases in which
buyers obtain a permit in order to purchase a handgun.11
10In further analyses, available on request, we show that neither the supply of nor the demand for gun
shows (the latter measured by Google Search results) witnessed a stronger impact of the demand shock
in NoDelay over Delay states, effectively showing that displacement to these states does not seem to be
a cause for concern.
11This procedure could not be applied for Hawaii, Illinois and Massachusetts as permit checks in these
states may also include permits for long guns. Permits were also not added to handgun sale checks
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A closer investigation of the NICS data revealed several outliers and reporting
issues. We therefore removed Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania
and Utah, as well as parts of the series for Iowa, Maryland and Wisconsin from the
sample.12 Furthermore, we drop Connecticut and Michigan. The former was host to
the Sandy Hook shooting and thus may invalidate our identification assumptions, while
the latter switched treatment status during our period of observation from requiring
a permit to not requiring a permit. Performing the steps above yields our baseline
sample consisting of 43 U.S. states for investigating the effect of delay laws on handgun
sales (BL1 ). While we prefer this restricted sample for our analysis of the NICS data,
robustness checks for our main results show that alternative (and less restrictive) sample
definitions generate qualitatively similar results.
3.2 Homicide and Mortality
For our main outcome of interest, homicides, there are two main statistical sources in
the United States: death certificates from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS)
and police reports from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR). Despite
the UCR data being widely used to study crime, they are known to suffer from reporting
issues that need to be taken into account by removing areas with unreliable data from
the sample (Targonski, 2011). Coverage is therefore not universal. The NVSS data, on
the other hand, contains all U.S. death certificates in a given year. We obtained the
data via the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for the entire sample
period between November 2010 and October 2013. The data set contains ICD-10 codes
for the underlying cause of each death, as well as the victim’s demographics, county of
residence and circumstances of the injury such as location and date. The ICD-10 codes
allow us to distinguish not only between homicides, suicides and fatal accidents but also
whether any of these were inflicted through a handgun or not.13 In order to increase the
power of our statistical analysis, we make use of the detailed geographical information
for Florida where, for no apparent reason, almost all months report 0 permit checks (and single digits
for non-zero months) until April 2013, when they suddenly jump to 15,000-30,000 per month for the
remainder of the sample period. Any further reference to handgun background checks implicitly includes
background checks made for permits, unless otherwise stated.
12Outliers are mainly due to permit re-checks and law changes associated with large mechanic jumps
in background check activity. We provide explicit reasoning for these choices in Appendix Section A.2.
13Our measure of handgun-related incidents also encompasses instances when an undetermined type
of firearm was used. This should not bias our estimates in any way, and it is corroborated by the fact




Not in NICS sample (BL1)
Not in NVSS sample (BL2)
Figure 2: States and counties represented in the NICS and NVSS samples
Map of the United States showing the states contained in the NICS background check data and counties contained
in the NVSS homicide data. Red counties are located in NoDelay states. Blue counties are located in Delay
states. Shaded states are dropped in their entirety from the NICS sample. Dark grey counties are not present in
the NVSS sample.
in the NVSS and use disaggregated data at the county-month level. This provides us
with a balanced panel of homicide counts for 3,047 counties which we normalize by the
county’s 2010 population in 100,000. This second baseline sample, denoted as BL2,
covers every U.S. state apart from Connecticut and Michigan for the same reasons as
stated above and we use it in all analyses based on non-NICS data. Figure 2 shows the
counties represented in our NVSS sample BL2 and highlights states which were removed
in the NICS sample BL1. In our robustness checks, we show that applying more or less
stringent sample restrictions yield very similar results.
In order to cross-validate our results and delve deeper into homicide circumstances,
we also use the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) series from the aforementioned
UCR data, bearing in mind the limitations of the data. These reports are compiled from
voluntary submissions by individual law enforcement agencies to the FBI and contain
detailed information such as demographics of victim and offender, the type of weapon
used as well as murder circumstances (e.g. argument or gang-related crime). We clean
the SHR data following the procedure described in Appendix A.4 and then collapse
observations into a balanced monthly panel for 2,229 counties. Counts are normalized
using the aggregate population in 100,000 covered by the reporting agencies within a
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specific county in 2010. Both UCR and NVSS crime rates are converted into logs using
the same arcnsinh transformation as for the NICS data.
3.3 Gun Interest and Controls
In order to assess whether consumers in states with and without handgun purchase
delays have similar preferences, we need to separate initial intentions to buy handguns
from actual purchases. While we use NICS data to measure the latter, we rely on
internet search data from Google Trends as a proxy for people’s intention to purchase
firearms. We focus on searches for the term “gun store”, which has been shown to be
a good predictor of firearm purchasing intentions by prior research (Scott and Varian,
2014). Since Google search data is not readily available in absolute numbers we adopt
a technique similar to the one used by Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018) to construct a
state-level panel of weekly Google searches for “gun store”.14
In addition to this, we use several control variables to account for potential con-
founders as well as differences in socio-economic characteristics across counties and
states. Our core set of covariates includes log of population, the shares of population
living in rural areas and below the poverty line as well as the percentages of black
and hispanic inhabitants. All variables were obtained from the 2010 U.S. Decennial
Census at the county level (and aggregated for state-level analyses). In addition, we
collected state-level data on the percentage of households with internet access from the
2010 American Community Survey which we include in regressions using Google search
data. In selecting these control variables, we broadly followed the choices made in prior
studies which have investigated the relationship between firearm prevalence and crime
(e.g. Cook and Ludwig, 2006; Duggan, 2001). To allow for a dynamic impact of our
cross-sectional control variables, we interact each of them with a full set of year-month
fixed effects. Further variables used only for robustness checks, such as measures of gun
supply, are introduced and explained where appropriate.




To estimate the effect of delay laws on handgun purchases and mortality during the
demand shock, we use a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) regression model, which over-
lays the cross-sectional variation in pre-existing purchase delay laws with time-series
variation from the six-month surge in firearm demand across the United States. To
take into account location-specific seasonality, all our outcome variables are seasonally
differenced by subtracting their 12-month lag (denoted as ∆12). Our main specifications
thus read as follows:
∆12 log(HandgunSalesst) = α + β1(Delays × Post1t) + β2(Delays × Post2t)
+ δtXs + λt + γs + φs × t + εst (1)
∆12 log(Homicidesct) = α + β1(Delays × Post1t) + β2(Delays × Post2t)
+ δtXc + λt + γc + φc × t + εct (2)
We use Equation 1 to estimate the effect of the demand surge on handgun sales
in Delay over NoDelay states. Equation 2 is effectively the county-level analogue of
Equation 1 but instead uses homicide rates as outcome variables. In these equations, the
specific effect of delay laws during the demand shock captured via Delays × Post1t can
be regarded as a shifter for new gun owners. Delays is a dummy variable for states with
delay laws as described in Section 2.1 and summarised in Table 1, i.e. California, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia. This
state indicator is interacted with Post1t, a dummy for time periods starting after the
Obama re-election on November 6th, 2012 and ending after April 17th, 2013 when the
proposals for a renewed assault weapons ban and universal background checks were
defeated in the U.S. Senate. Our primary coefficient of interest is β1 and captures the
average proportionate difference in HandgunSales and Homicides between Delay and
NoDelay states during the demand shock. We also include a second interaction using
the time dummy Post2t for time periods starting after April 17th 2013 to investigate
15
effects beyond the initial six months. This also allows testing whether Delay states
experience comparatively fewer handgun purchases over the entire time period or if this
is compensated by more sales later on.
Apart from location (state or county) and time fixed-effects γs, γc and λt, the DiD
regressions also allow for location-specific linear trends φs×t and φc×t to account for the
possibility that some areas may deviate from general trends in background checks and
homicides. Furthermore, our regression models each also feature a set of control variables
X. We avoid concerns about “bad controls” by using interactions of pre-determined,
time-invariant factors and time fixed effects. The variables included in this way are %
hispanics, % black, % rural, log of population, and % poverty.15 ε denotes the residual.
The standard errors used for inference are clustered by state as the level of treatment
assignment to account for serial correlation in the error terms. Regressions are weighted
by the state/county population to reduce the impact of less densely populated areas and
to obtain U.S. wide average effects.16
A potential alternative to our approach would be to estimate a gun owner-homicide
elasticity using Delays × Post1t as an instrument. Our preference for the somewhat
cruder reduced-form relationship stems from two factors. The first are the limitations of
the NICS data discussed above. NICS background checks do not allow to draw direct in-
ference on changes in the existing population of gun owners, making an elasticity hardly
comparable to other studies. This concern is compounded by issues of measurement
error, as not all background checks lead to firearm purchases and not all purchases are
reflected in the background check counts. Our second concern is that we do not expect
the effect of gun owners on homicides to be overly large since the vast majority of gun
owners are law-abiding citizens (Fabio et al., 2016). In order to precisely estimate such a
small effect, one would need a fairly large sample at the county level for which, however,
no NICS data exists. We thus estimate the raw effect of handgun purchase frictions
on sales and homicide rates during the demand shock but do not pin down a precise
elasticity given the absence of reliable panel data on firearm ownership.
15This approach prescribes a parsimonious use of control variables. The exact choice of covariates
does not seem to be crucial to the results. In an earlier version of this paper where we used a slightly
altered set of covariates, we obtain very similar results. See http://www.bristol.ac.uk/efm/media/
workingpapers/working papers/pdffiles/dp18694.pdf.
16Each of these estimation decisions is reassessed in sections 5.1 and 6.2 and we provide supplementary
results in the Appendix.
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4.2 Validity of Identifying Assumptions
In order for our DiD design to yield causal effects, two assumptions need to be fulfilled.
The first, commonly referred to as the parallel trends assumption, requires outcomes to
have evolved similarly in the absence of treatment. This may particularly be a concern
as delay laws have not been exogenously assigned to states, and as such, any differential
reaction to the shock may just be an expression of differences in unobservables. We take
several measures to alleviate concerns that this assumption may be violated. First, we
show that our outcome measures were following similar trends in Delay and NoDelay
states prior to the demand shock to prevent that our estimates are simply picking
up pre-treatment divergence. As we can see from Figures 3 and 4, handgun sales
and homicides in both groups of states are sharply diverging during the six month
window of increased firearm demand. There is also a slight divergence for handgun sales
in preceding years which highlights the need for seasonal differencing.17 Second, we
report results with location-specific linear time trends for all our specifications as a first
robustness check. In order to credibly identify pre-existing trends, our baseline sample
length uses an asymmetric sample period 36 months before to 12 months after the 2012
election (November 2009 to October 2013) in the spirit of Wolfers (2006).18 Finally, we
also perform an event-study analysis to investigate concerns about non-linear pre-trends.
The second prerequisite is the absence of correlated shocks, i.e. other events coincid-
ing with the demand hike and being positively (negatively) correlated with the existence
of delay laws but negatively (positively) with background checks and homicide rates. As
argued above, the outcome of the 2012 election as well as the timing of the Sandy Hook
shooting are unrelated to any relevant outcome variables, and were arguably the most
notable events at the time. We tackle remaining concerns in three ways. First, all
regressions control for socio-demographic factors known to be correlated with both gun
ownership and crime. Second, we corroborate the role of delay laws by running a series
of horserace regressions where we add interactions of Post1 and Post2 with potential
confounders such as other types of gun laws and correlates of gun popularity like gun
owners and gun stores per capita. The latter also indirectly addresses concerns about
a supply side response. Finally, in our mechanism section we use Google search data
17Appendix Figures 18/19 and 20/21 depict the evolution of both variables in levels and 12-month
growth rates.
18Note that after applying seasonal differencing, the nominal sample period starts in November 2010




















































































































































Delay states NoDelay states
Figure 3: Log background check rate for handguns in Delay vs NoDelay states
Log of monthly NICS handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants in Delay states and NoDelay states
between November 2009 and October 2013. The sample encompasses data for all states consistently included
in our main specification. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e.
November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period for preceding years. For









































































































































Delay states NoDelay states
Figure 4: Log homicide rate in Delay vs NoDelay states
Log of monthly homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Delay states and NoDelay states between November 2009
and October 2013. The sample encompasses data from all counties consistently included in our main specification.
The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013.
Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period for preceding years. For better visibility, each series has
been re-scaled to 0 on the last observation before the treatment.
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to show that the divergence in gun sales following the shock does not coincide with a
similar divergence in the interest to purchase a firearm.
5 The Effect of Delay Laws on Firearm Purchases
5.1 Results
In Table 2 we estimate the differential impact of the 6-month demand hike in Delay
states on our handgun sale measure. The table also reports results for total and non-
handgun sale background checks per capita. The main coefficient of interest is β1 from
Equation 1 which represents the percentage difference of the sales rate response to the
demand shock in Delay states compared to NoDelay states. Column 1 shows a significant
negative effect in the first six months after the Presidential election and a positive non-
significant effect in the second period of about half. This potential postponement effect,
however, disappears when adding controls in column 2, while the coefficient for the
Post1 period remains marginally significant. When accounting for potentially diverging
pre-trends by adding state-specific linear time trends in column 3, the estimate for β1
gains precision while β2 decreases further. A very likely explanation for this result would
be that this specification reduces noise from diverging trends in smaller states without
a large influence on the overall (weighted) coefficient.
Our preferred estimate is the more conservative specification in column 3.19 The
results imply that sales rates were 7.3% lower in Delay states during the first six months
than in NoDelay states. Columns 4 to 7 show that firearm purchase delay laws did not
significantly affect overall background checks as well as other gun-related transactions
(e.g. sales of long guns).
5.2 Robustness Checks
As highlighted in Section 4.2, our identification strategy hinges on the validity of the
parallel trends assumption and the absence of correlated shocks. Even though our
results in Table 2 are robust to the inclusion of state-specific linear trends, one may
argue that this does not accurately capture non-linear pre-trends. We investigate this
19Both specifications are informative, however, in our view. As we do not know whether the ‘true’
model exhibits trends, it is ex ante unclear whether column 2 or 3 should be preferred. We therefore
report specifications with and without trends for all results in order to provide a more complete picture.
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Table 2: Handgun sale background checks
∆12 Log of background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Handgun Sale Total Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Delay×Post1 −0.112∗∗∗ −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.039 −0.030 0.009 0.021
(0.041) (0.044) (0.033) (0.027) (0.023) (0.052) (0.048)
Delay×Post2 0.057 0.010 0.007 0.043 0.048 0.102 0.116
(0.062) (0.064) (0.084) (0.055) (0.062) (0.096) (0.094)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N N Y N Y N Y
States 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Observations 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516
R2 0.446 0.539 0.594 0.689 0.724 0.678 0.757
Notes: Observations are at the state-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month
FE. Regressions are weighted by the state population.
possibility using an event-study design based on column 2 in Table 2 in which we allow
for month-by-month treatment effects. The results are depicted in Figure 5 and show
no indication non-linear pre-trends. In the two years before November 2012, we do
not observe a clear pattern of up- or downward trends in our estimation. After the
2012 Presidential election, however, the effect of Delay states on handgun sales starts
becoming increasingly negative and peaks in size in January 2013. After that, the
coefficients gradually move back to the pre-period level and remain insignificant for the
entire Post2 period. This also provides additional evidence against the possibility that
firearm purchases were merely postponed.
The hypothesis of no correlated shocks mandates that no other factors related to
the existence of delay laws should affect handgun sales during the demand shock.
One fundamental competing explanation would be that lower sales were produced by
unobserved heterogeneity in actual preferences for firearms. Similarly, supply side
responses, such as discount sales during the demand shock, may be more frequent in
NoDelay states. Finally, purchase delays could also be masking the impact of other
restrictive firearm laws. We test the plausibility of these alternative explanations by
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Effect of Delay state
on Log of handgun sale bg checks per 100,000 pop
Figure 5: Event study graph for NICS background checks
Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of being in a Delay state on ∆12 Log of NICS handgun
background checks per 100,000 inhabitants for each month between November 2010 and October 2013. The dark
grey-shaded area includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light
grey-shaded areas are marking the same period for preceding years.
In Table 3 we first explore the impact of gun popularity and firearm supply capacity:
1) estimates for the 2013 state-level rate of gun ownership from YouGov published by
Kalesan et al. (2015) in columns 3 and 4, and 2) gun stores per capita as of December
2010 calculated from data by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(2010) in columns 5 and 6. We then run similar horse-race regression with two different
types of restrictive gun legislation obtained from Siegel et al. (2017): 1) the absence of
stand-your-ground laws which give immunity for shooting an intruder in one’s home
(columns 7 and 8), and 2) prohibiting domestic violence offenders from possessing
firearms (columns 9 and 10). Our coefficient of interest remains stable. Differences
in firearm preferences, supply and other restrictive gun laws thus do not seem to be
driving our results on handgun sale background checks.20 Appendix Section B.1 provides
results from placebo checks and sensitivity analyses regarding sample composition, data
transformation and weighting.
20In additional regressions, available upon request, we also demonstrate that gun sales had not simply
been displaced to secondary markets by analyzing the demand and supply for gun shows, respectively.
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Table 3: Handgun background checks (gun preferences & other gun laws)
∆12 Log of handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Confounder Gun Owners Gun Stores No Stand-your- Domestic Abu-
represents... p.c. p.c. ground law = 1 ser’s Law = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗−0.074∗ −0.065∗ −0.071∗ −0.063∗∗−0.071∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.082∗ −0.073∗∗
(0.044) (0.033) (0.044) (0.033) (0.042) (0.032) (0.038) (0.030) (0.046) (0.033)
Delay×Post2 0.010 0.007 0.001 −0.006 −0.003 −0.007 0.000 −0.008 −0.004 −0.009
(0.064) (0.084) (0.069) (0.091) (0.066) (0.086) (0.066) (0.080) (0.061) (0.084)
Confounder×Post1 0.131 0.134 0.002∗ 0.002∗ −0.048∗ −0.028 0.011 0.025
(0.136) (0.143) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.030)
Confounder×Post2 −0.208 −0.264 −0.002 −0.002 0.051 0.072 0.145∗∗ 0.172∗∗
(0.363) (0.411) (0.002) (0.002) (0.078) (0.088) (0.058) (0.071)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.539 0.594 0.540 0.596 0.544 0.599 0.543 0.598 0.556 0.613
Notes: All regressions use 1,516 observations from 43 states. Observations are at the state-month-level. The
sample period is November 2010 until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and
1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in
November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Included control variables are log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All
variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the state population.
5.3 Mechanisms
Having established different reactions in handgun sales between Delay and NoDelay
states, we now evaluate whether our findings could be driven by impulsive consumers.
A first way to characterize impulsive agents is the potential divergence between plans
and actions. In other words, impulsive consumers may decide to buy a firearm under
the influence of transient emotions but eventually do not buy since these emotions have
already passed. This should not be observed for regular, non-impulsive consumers if
they make a fully rational purchase decision. However, a delay in receiving the gun
makes the purchase also less attractive for non-impulsive consumers since it reduces the
item’s net present value. If, however, the decision not to buy is driven predominantly by
standard exponential discounting, we should observe that longer delays reduce purchases
substantially more than shorter delays. Impulsive agents, however, would be deterred by
any delay since they cannot get hold of the firearm while being in a particular emotional
state. A second characteristic of impulsiveness would thus be that even very short delays
should have a notable impact on the likelihood to buy.21
21These predictions can also be formally derived in a theoretical framework which is available on
request but omitted here for the sake of space.
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Table 4: Online searches & Handgun background checks (delay length)
∆52 Log std’zed
share of Google ∆12 Log of handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
searches for
“gun store”
Maximum D ≤ 30 D ≤ 14 D ≤ 3
delay Baseline Drop NY Drop MD, NC, Drop CA, DC
length (=12 delay states) (=11) NJ (=8) MN, RI (=4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 0.037 −0.017 −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.072 −0.073∗∗−0.103∗ −0.087∗∗ −0.071∗∗−0.075∗
(0.082) (0.090) (0.044) (0.033) (0.049) (0.035) (0.053) (0.042) (0.036) (0.038)
Delay×Post2 −0.027 −0.081 0.010 0.007 0.013 −0.000 −0.001 −0.006 −0.131∗∗−0.174
(0.097) (0.133) (0.064) (0.084) (0.074) (0.094) (0.080) (0.116) (0.059) (0.120)
Year-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
States 49 49 43 43 42 42 39 39 35 35
Observations 7,693 7,693 1,516 1,516 1,480 1,480 1,374 1,374 1,230 1,230
R2 0.230 0.247 0.539 0.594 0.546 0.600 0.561 0.605 0.613 0.663
p(β1 = −0.073) 1 1 0.57 0.73 0.97 0.96
Notes: Observations are at the state-week-level (Google) or state-month-level (NICS). The sample period
is November 2010 until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after
the 2012 election. Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November
2009. Standard errors clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included
control variables are log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks, % hispanics and % with internet
access (Google only). All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Week FE (Google) or Month FE (NICS).
Regressions are weighted by the state population.
We start by investigating the congruence between plans to buy firearms and actual
sales. This analysis uses Google searches for the term “gun store” which serves as a
proxy for public interest in buying a gun and has been identified as a strong predictor for
firearm purchasing intentions in previous research by Scott and Varian (2014). Columns
1 and 2 in Table 4 repeat our preferred regression specifications using Google searches for
“gun store” as the dependent variable. We do not detect large or significantly different
changes in search results which provides evidence that the different evolution of gun
sales in the wake of the demand shock was not driven by different preferences for and
intentions to buy firearms.22 This is additional evidence that our results are unlikely to
be driven by unobserved heterogeneity across states. More importantly, these findings
indicate a mismatch between intentions to purchase a firearm and actual sales in Delay
states. However, these results could also reflect that potential buyers do not know
their state’s firearm laws while searching for a gun store, but only learn about purchase
22Figure 22 in the Appendix shows the development of Google searches between November 2009
and October 2013 graphically. A regression using levels and producing similar results can be found in
Appendix Table 21.
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delays at a later point and then deliberately decide not to buy. For such non-impulsive
consumers, we should observe that decreasing delay lengths smoothly reduce the effect,
something we test for next.
Our second test checks whether states with very short delays show a similar pattern
as states with longer delays. In columns 3 to 10 in Table 4, we use our two main
specifications from Table 2 and gradually exclude states with delay lengths exceeding
30, 14 and 3 days. The table also features tests for coefficient equality of β1 in the
short-delay and the baseline sample. Overall, we do not detect strong variations in
the estimated coefficients for β1. In the most restrictive specifications 9 and 10 with
only 4 treatment states and at most 3 days of delay, the estimates are still very close
to the baseline in columns 3 and 4. The Wald tests can never confidently reject the
null hypothesis of coefficient equality for β1. The absence of a systematic decrease in
the effect size suggests that gun buyers may in fact respond more to the presence of a
delay per se, rather than its length.23 This evidence lends further support to the above
conjecture that the difference in sales between the two group of states is predominantly
driven by impulsive consumers.
6 The Effect of Delay Laws on Homicides
6.1 Results
Starting from the observation that handgun sales increased significantly less in De-
lay states during the 2012 firearm demand shock, we investigate if there was also a
corresponding effect on homicide rates.24 Table 5 shows the results from Equation 2.
Observations are now at the county-month level, and the sample includes all states
which were previously omitted due to measurement error in the background check data.
Column 1 shows that Delay states experienced a significant relative drop in gun homicide
rates by 2.4% after the start of the firearm demand shock, and an insignificant further
1.4% relative decrease during Post2. Controlling for observables in column 2 yields
a significant 2.2% relative drop in Delay states’ handgun homicide rates during the
23In Appendix Table 22 we also show that including transaction costs from e.g. gun licensing fees in
our regressions does not qualitatively change our findings regarding the effect of purchase delay laws.
24In unreported results, we also investigate the effect on crime other than murder, providing a test
of the “more guns, less crime” hypothesis, without being able to detect a systematic deterrence effect
of guns. These findings are available upon request. In Appendix Section B.3, we study the effect on
suicides and accidents.
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Table 5: Baseline: homicide rates
∆12 Log of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Handgun Any Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Delay×Post1 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.021 −0.002 −0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
Delay×Post2 −0.014 −0.018 −0.015 0.002 0.005 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N N Y N Y N Y
Counties 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047
Observations 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692
R2 0.002 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.014
Notes: Observations are at the county-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month
FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
treatment period Post1 and an insignificant relative decline of 1.8% in Post2. The
inclusion of county trends in column 3 mainly leads to a loss in precision but only
slightly diminishes β1 to −0.019, which is still significant at 5%.
Columns 4 and 5 show that the Post1 effect for handgun homicides is also reflected
in decreased aggregate homicide rates of about the same magnitude. This effect is
significant at the 5% level without county trends, but loses significance when trends are
included. Notably, there is virtually no impact of delay laws on overall homicides in the
Post2 period. The reason for this becomes apparent when looking at the results for non-
handgun homicides in specifications 6 and 7. Here we see a significant increase which
explains the zero-effect in the aggregate homicide rates during Post2. A straightforward
explanation could be that the reaction of NoDelay states reflects two different channels
through which increased handgun ownership can affect homicides. One would be a
lethality effect by which random acts of aggression or anger turn into the shooting and
killing of another person. The other effect would be a substitution effect whereby homi-
cides are simply carried out by handguns instead of other weapons with no aggregate
effect. Our results are indicative of both effects as non-handgun homicides significantly
increase in Post2, but we also observe a significant increase in aggregate homicides in
Post1. Since our main interest are delay laws’ aggregate effects, the remainder of this
25
paper focuses on the lethality effect and the impact of delay laws on handgun-related
homicides during the Post1 period.
6.2 Robustness Checks
We run similar checks as in Section 5.2 to establish the validity of our identification
strategy. First, we investigate the possibility of non-linear pre-trends using an event-
study design. Figure 6 indeed does not show any systematic effect for handgun-induced
homicides before the onset of the treatment. During our treatment period Post1,
however, there is a clear negative impact for November 2012, December 2012 and March
2013.25 The strong and significant homicide effect in November is rather noteworthy, as
Figure 5 showed a negative effect for handgun sales for November, but only displayed
individual statistical significance for December onwards. Furthermore, the significant
effect on homicides in March does not coincide with a similar effect on gun sales. One
possible explanation could be that individuals purchasing handguns directly after the
shock in November are especially impulsive, such that purchases translate into homicides
rather quickly. Individuals buying within the next two months may be less impulsive so
that it would take longer for their impulsiveness to also translate into a homicide. Our
data unfortunately does not allow us to test such a conjecture and thus entirely rule
out alternative explanations. Table 6 shows that also our findings on handgun homicide
rates are not a by-product of underlying preferences for firearms or the existence of
other restrictive gun laws. In Appendix Section B.2, we discuss and report placebo
checks, state-level results and sensitivity analyses of our sample composition, data
transformation and weighting choices.
6.3 Mechanisms
Our previous analyses in Section 5.3 have provided tentative evidence that impulsive
consumers are likely to drive the differences in handgun sale background checks between
Delay and NoDelay states. In this section we try to provide evidence that also our results
on homicides can be traced back to impulsive behavior. We do so by taking a closer look
25Appendix Figure 23 further shows no systematic effect on non-handgun homicides before or during
our treatment. The positive effect observed during Post2 in the baseline regressions applies to all months
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Figure 6: Event study graph for handgun homicide rate
Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of being in a Delay state on ∆12 Log handgun homicide
per 100,000 inhabitants for each month between November 2010 and October 2013. The dark grey-shaded area
includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas
are marking the same period for preceding years.
Table 6: Handgun homicide rates (gun preferences & other gun laws)
∆12 Log of handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Confounder Gun Owners Gun Stores No Stand-your- Domestic Abu-
represents... p.c. p.c. ground law = 1 ser’s Law = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗−0.019∗∗−0.020∗∗−0.022∗∗−0.022∗∗∗−0.020∗ −0.018∗∗∗−0.019∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗−0.021∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 −0.013 −0.015 −0.017 −0.015 −0.014 −0.015 −0.017 −0.017
(0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Confounder×Post1 0.021 −0.023 −0.000 −0.000 −0.008 −0.000 0.000 0.009
(0.043) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
Confounder×Post2 0.048 0.004 0.000 0.000 −0.010 −0.002 −0.002 0.007
(0.058) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019
Notes: All regressions use 109,692 observations from 3,047 counties. The sample period is November 2010
until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election.
Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors
clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are
log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and
interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
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Table 7: Effect on homicide rates: victim sex
∆12 Log of handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Victim sex Any Male Female
Victim age Any Any 20-29 Any 20-29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗−0.019∗∗ −0.013 −0.011 −0.011∗ −0.008 −0.009∗∗ −0.008∗ −0.006∗∗∗−0.006∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 −0.018 −0.016 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.015) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.020 0.012 0.023 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.016
Notes: All regressions use 109,692 observations from 3,047 counties. The sample period is November 2010
until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election.
Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors
clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are
log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and
interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
at the type of additional handgun homicides in NoDelay states (or equivalently which
were “prevented” in Delay states).
Table 7 presents the results split up by victim sex with a particular focus on the 20
to 29 age group, into which the majority of first-time buyers should fall.26 The results
show that men make up about 2/3 of the victims while women account for 1/3. The
coefficients for female victims, however, are more precisely estimated. Both male and
female victims are predominantly aged 20 to 29. These findings suggest that female
victims are overrepresented, as less than 10% of overall homicide victims are women
in our data. Given this and our evidence on impulsive consumers, we investigate the
role of domestic violence. To do so, we split the handgun homicide victims into those
who were shot in their home and those who were assaulted elsewhere. Table 8 reports
the corresponding results. For the male victims we find that the entire effect is driven
by attacks outside their home. Female victims, on the other hand, are predominantly
assaulted in their place of living, consistent with instances of domestic violence.
In order to obtain more evidence that points towards domestic killings, we present
results using the UCR SHR data on homicide circumstances in Table 9.27 Columns 1 to
26Appendix Table 23 shows corresponding results for all other age groups. We also report victim splits
by race in Appendix Table 24 and show that, in line with the overall demographics of homicide victims
in the United States, victims tend to be almost evenly categorized as ’White’ and ’Black’.
27As outlined in Section 3.2, this data exhibits a more restricted coverage. Appendix Table 25 shows
that the UCR SHR data yield qualitatively similar estimates compared to the NVSS data in our Post1
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Table 8: Effect on homicide rates: place of assault
∆12 Log of handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Victim sex Male Female
Place of assault Home Not Home Home Not Home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delay×Post1 0.006 0.004 −0.018∗ −0.014 −0.007∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Delay×Post2 −0.012∗ −0.014∗ −0.009 −0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.006 0.017 0.011 0.023 0.004 0.014 0.006 0.016
Notes: All regressions use 109,692 observations from 3,047 counties. The sample period is November 2010
until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election.
Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors
clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are
log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and
interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
2 show the baseline specification for handgun homicides reported in the UCR SHR and
then split these into specific murder circumstances. The results for aggregate handgun
homicides have the same sign as those using the NVSS data but are only about 2/3 in
size and insignificant, likely due to the more limited coverage and data quality. The
results in columns 3 and 4, however, indicate that deadly assaults related to arguments
account for the main part of the additional handgun homicides in NoDelay states. Unlike
for the aggregate handgun murder rate, this effect is also highly significant. All other
types of homicide circumstances such as brawls, (organized) crime and defense as well as
other/undetermined, do not seem to be systematically affected during the Post1 period.
These findings lend further support to the hypothesis that impulsive consumers are
driving the differences in handgun homicides during the demand shock.
Summarizing these findings, we observe that the additional homicides of females in
NoDelay states primarily happened inside their home, predominantly to women between
20 and 29, and often as a result of arguments. Homicides of men, instead, happened
primarily outside their home, but also largely because of arguments. Similar to women,
male victims are typically 20-29 years old. In terms of mechanisms, our findings suggest
domestic violence and other heat of the moment murders as a possible explanation
for the observed differences in homicides between Delay and NoDelay states. These
period of interest. A map illustrating the exact coverage for the UCR data is shown in Appendix
Figure 14.
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Table 9: Murder Reports: circumstances
∆12 Log of handgun murders per 100,000 inhabitants
Circumstances Any Arguments Brawls Gang, Felony All Other
or Defense
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 −0.014 −0.013 −0.010∗∗∗−0.016∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002 −0.000 −0.008 −0.008 0.005
(0.011) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Delay×Post2 0.003 0.004 −0.007 −0.013 −0.000 −0.000 −0.006 −0.014 0.018 0.031∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.010 0.021 0.009 0.020 0.013 0.023 0.020 0.041 0.010 0.027
Notes: All regressions use 80,244 observations from 2,229 counties. Observations are at the
county-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month
window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal
sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks
and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the
county population.
interpretations are in line with insights by Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone (2004) that
impulsiveness is correlated across domains.
7 Conclusion
In light of the persistently high rate of firearm homicides in the United States, under-
standing the consequences of legislation limiting access to guns is imperative. One of the
main arguments used by proponents of gun rights are that gun laws do not substantially
affect violent crime but impose excessive burdens on law-abiding gun owners. In this
study we focus on the effects of a specific type of policy measure, handgun purchase
delay laws, and provide evidence that, while not infringing with Second Amendment
rights, these laws can substantially reduce homicides through the prevention of impulsive
purchases.
We present empirical evidence that states with delay laws in place saw comparatively
smaller handgun sales during a demand shock after the re-election of President Obama
in 2012 and the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Further results show that
purchase delays have strong effects even when they are very short and did not affect
intentions to buy a firearm but only the likelihood of consumers of making an actual
handgun purchase. In the second part of our analysis, we investigate delay laws’ effect
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on homicide rates. Using detailed micro-data on mortality, we find a significant effect of
delay laws on handgun-related homicides during the period of the demand shock. The
effect size is about 2% which in turn implies that about 200 homicides could have been
“prevented” during the six-month Post1 period if all U.S. states had had some sort
of purchase delay law in place. These additional homicides encompass both genders,
and indicate that arguments as well as domestic violence constitute some of the main
channels through which handgun ownership by impulsive individuals may affect homicide
rates.
We see our study as a good starting point for more nuanced investigations into
the relation between gun ownership and crime. First, additional direct evidence on the
circumstances linking gun sales to violent crime is needed. While our results were able to
point in the direction of arguments and domestic violence, the results are far from clear-
cut. With increasing coverage of the FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting System
(NIBRS), more detailed information on particular crime incidents could be utilized to
study similar future firearm demand shocks. Second, given the absence of accurate
data on how county-level gun ownership evolves over time, our study cannot pin down
an exact gun-homicide elasticity. The NICS data is very noisy and makes cross-state
comparison impossible at times. We thus stress the need for a more transparent, county-
level version of handgun sales than what is currently available. Finally, we believe that
more research is needed to evaluate costs and benefits of specific gun laws. As shown in
this study, the positive effects of purchase delays may be understated. Rigorous analyses
of gun laws may therefore help foster a more informed debate on gun policy.
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Coding and Data Cleaning
A.1 Firearm Purchase Delays
As already stated in the main text, there is substantial heterogeneity in firearm pur-
chasing and sales restrictions imposed by the states. For example, many states invoke
restrictions on the prerequisites and responsibilities of gun dealers, such as whether they
require an additional state license to operate their business or whether they are supposed
to keep centrally stored electronic records of transactions. Other legal restrictions
concern buyers, as states can for instance decide if they want buyers to be able to
purchase guns in bulk, if buyers need a permit prior to purchase, if they have to
undergo background checks (for transactions exempted from federal background check
requirements), or if buyers are required to wait a certain amount of time between
purchasing and receiving their gun. Finally, there exists legislation concerned with
restrictions on carrying firearms in public places, including schools and the workplace.
For this study, we are primarily interested in restrictions that delay the purchase of a
handgun. These are mandatory waiting periods and firearm purchasing (or ownership)
permits. Between November 2009 and October 2013, the period of our study, nine states
and the District of Columbia had imposed mandatory waiting periods. California and
D.C. require 10 days, Hawaii 14 days, Rhode Island 7 days and Illinois between 24 hours
(long guns) to 72 hours (handguns) on all firearm purchases. Minnesota is the only state
to require 7 days wait between purchase and pickup of handguns and assault rifles only.
Maryland and New Jersey impose 7 days for handguns, while Florida and Iowa impose
a 3 day waiting period for handguns. Wisconsin repealed its 48 hour waiting time on
handguns in 2015.
Furthermore, some states require a license to possess or buy a firearm prior to the
actual purchase, which due to bureaucratic hurdles can also impose a waiting time.
In Connecticut, a handgun eligibility certificate may take up to 60 days before being
issued. Before buying a gun in Hawaii, prospective gun owners have to obtain a permit
to purchase which can take up to 20 days to be issued. Buyers in Illinois have to
obtain a Firearm Owner’s Identification card (FOID) before being allowed to purchase
an unlimited number of firearms in the following ten years. Obtaining an FOID can take
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up to 30 days. The state of Maryland requires buyers to hold a Handgun Qualification
License which will be issued or denied within 30 days of application. In Massachusetts,
authorities may take up to 40 days to process a request for a license to carry or a
Firearm Identification Card (FID), where the former allows unlimited purchases of
any firearms without additional paperwork and the latter is restricted to rifles and
shotguns. Nebraska requires potential buyers of handguns to be in possession of a
handgun certificate or a concealed carry permit, which may take up to 2 days to be
issued. The permit allows unlimited purchase of handguns in a 3 year period. Residents
of New Jersey in turn must obtain a permit to purchase a handgun for each purchase
separately, while they can purchase unlimited shotguns and rifles with a Firearms
Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC). Authorities may take up to 30 days to issue
such a permit. In New York, a license to possess or carry a handgun is necessary for
each gun and obtaining one can take up to six months. In North Carolina, a license to
purchase a handgun can take up to 30 days to be issued, and it is valid for one gun only.
Our starting point is the classification of the 50 U.S. states as having waiting periods
or permit requirements for handgun sales between 2009 to 2013 according to Siegel et al.
(2017). We then complement this data with information on the District of Columbia and
actual delay length using Cherney, Moral, and Schell (2018). Finally, we cross-check the
data with classifications provided by Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence (2012a,b).
Any conflicting categorizations across the three sources are then resolved by looking
up the precise wording of the respective law. The final classification is summarized in
Table 10.
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Table 10: Sources used for determining delay laws during the sample period
State Waiting Source Permit Source
Period Delay
AL 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
AK 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
AZ 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
AR 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
CA 10 SFL (2017), RAND (2018) 0 SFL (2017), RAND (2018)
CO 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
CT 0 SFL (2017) 60 SFL (2017), RAND (2018)
DC 10 RAND (2018) 0 RAND (2018)
DE 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
FL 3 RAND (2018) 0 SFL (2017)
GA 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
HI 14 SFL (2017), RAND (2018) 20 SFL (2017), RAND (2018)
ID 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
IL 3 SFL (2017), RAND (2018) 30 SFL (2017), ∗
IN 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
IA 3 RAND (2018) 0 RAND (2018)
KS 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
KY 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
LA 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
ME 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
MD 7 SFL (2017), RAND (2018) 30 SFL (2017), BJS (2005)
MA 0 SFL (2017) 40 SFL (2017), †
MI 0 SFL (2017) 5 SFL (2017), BJS (2005)
MN 7 SFL (2017), RAND (2018) 0 RAND (2018)
MS 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
MO 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
MT 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
NE 0 SFL (2017) 2 SFL (2017), RAND (2018)
NV 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
NH 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
NJ 7 SFL (2017), ‡ 30 SFL (2017), RAND (2018)
NM 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
NY 0 SFL (2017) 180 SFL (2017), RAND (2018)
NC 0 SFL (2017) 30 SFL (2017), RAND (2018), §
ND 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
OH 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
OK 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
OR 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
PA 0 SFL (2017), ¶ 0 SFL (2017)
RI 7 SFL (2017), RAND (2018) 0 SFL (2017), RAND (2018)
SC 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
SD 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
TN 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
TX 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
UT 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
VT 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
VA 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
WA 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
WV 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
WI 2 SFL (2017), RAND (2018) 0 SFL (2017)
WY 0 SFL (2017) 0 SFL (2017)
SFL (2017)=Siegel et al. (2017)
RAND (2018)=Cherney, Moral, and Schell (2018)










A.2 Cleaning Procedure for NICS Data
To remove as many inaccuracies and problematic observations from the NICS sample
as possible, we apply the following approach. First, we discard Hawaii, Illinois and
Massachusetts, where permit checks also include those for long guns. In order to remove
outliers, we drop Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Utah, as well as parts of the series for
Iowa, Maryland and Wisconsin from the sample. Kentucky performs monthly rechecks of
existing permit holders, artificially inflating the data (Lang, 2013, 2016). Pennsylvania
did not record a single handgun sale background check from November 2009 until August
2012. Utah performed quarterly rechecks of existing permit holders in 2011 leading to
strong spikes in background checks from January 2010 to August 2011.28 Iowa changed
their gun laws in 2011, removing a requirement for demonstrating firearm proficiency
before a firearm could be acquired. This led to unusual background check jumps between
November 2010 and June 2011. Maryland changed its gun laws with respect to licensing
in 2013, leading to a massive background check increase in September and October
2013 (New York Times, 2015). Finally, Wisconsin passed a concealed-carry bill in 2011
leading to a jump in background checks from November 2011 to May 2012.29
28Our implicit rule was to drop an entire state series if outliers covered at least 12 consecutive months
between November 2009 and October 2013.
29In Appendix A.3 we plot the temporal variation in handgun sale and permit NICS background
checks for each state separately and specifically highlight the data irregularities for these states.
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Figure 7: Monthly NICS background checks, AL to DC
Monthly state-wise NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2009 and October 2013 in
absolute numbers. The red line shows background check for handguns, the blue line displays non-handgun
checks, and the black line equals the sum of the two. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months
after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Monthly NICS background checks, DE to IN
Monthly state-wise NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2009 and October 2013 in
absolute numbers. The red line shows background check for handguns, the blue line displays non-handgun
checks, and the black line equals the sum of the two. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months
after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: Monthly NICS background checks, KS to MN
Monthly state-wise NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2009 and October 2013 in
absolute numbers. The red line shows background check for handguns, the blue line displays non-handgun
checks, and the black line equals the sum of the two. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months
after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10: Monthly NICS background checks, MO to NJ
Monthly state-wise NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2009 and October 2013 in
absolute numbers. The red line shows background check for handguns, the blue line displays non-handgun
checks, and the black line equals the sum of the two. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months
after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11: Monthly NICS background checks, NM to RI
Monthly state-wise NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2009 and October 2013 in
absolute numbers. The red line shows background check for handguns, the blue line displays non-handgun
checks, and the black line equals the sum of the two. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months
after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: Monthly NICS background checks, SC to WA
Monthly state-wise NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2009 and October 2013 in
absolute numbers. The red line shows background check for handguns, the blue line displays non-handgun
checks, and the black line equals the sum of the two. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months
after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period























































































































































































Figure 13: Monthly NICS background checks, WI to WY
Monthly state-wise NICS background checks plotted over time between November 2009 and October 2013 in
absolute numbers. The red line shows background check for handguns, the blue line displays non-handgun
checks, and the black line equals the sum of the two. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months
after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period
for preceding years. Series of states removed from the NICS data as well as outlier dates are highlighted in yellow.
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A.4 Cleaning Procedure for UCR Data
The UCR crime data suffers from inconsistent reporting by some participating agen-
cies. Common reporting mistakes include large negative absolute values for crimes, or
continuously reporting zero crimes. These obvious problems of the UCR data have led
some scholars to conclude that the data should not be used in empirical analysis (Maltz
and Targonski, 2002). We take a more pragmatic approach and use the UCR data only
in supplementary analyses after applying the following data cleaning guidelines set out
in Targonski (2011).
First, we determine truly missing data points. An entry of zero could either mean
that no crimes occurred, or that the agency was not reporting any crimes. An additional
reporting variable however indirectly indicates, whether data was submitted. If no data
was submitted, this reporting variable will have missing values for that specific date.
We thus exclude all observations showing zero crimes, where the additional reporting
variable contains missing values. Second, there are some obvious cases of data bunching,
as there exist agencies that report their data only quarterly or (semi)annually, but
no data in the months between. We identify those observations using an algorithm
designed by Targonski and we also exclude them from the analysis.30 Third, some
smaller agencies choose to not report crimes themselves, but through another agency.
In that case, they show up as reporting zeroes, although their counts are reflected in
the data of the reporting agency. We drop those observations. Fourth, we apply the
rule of 20 to identify wrongly reported zero crimes. Whenever an agency reports on
average 20 or more crimes per month, it seems unlikely they experienced zero crime in
any given month. Such data points are also excluded from our analysis. Fifth, we delete
all observations with outlier values 999, 9999 and 99999 from the sample. Sixth, we
remove all data containing negative values smaller than -3.31
In addition to the cleaning procedure above, we drop data from all counties which do
not report consistently over the full sample period and report zero crimes throughout.
In order to ensure sufficient coverage and representativeness we also drop counties if the
consistently reporting agencies cover less than 50% of the county’s population in 2010.
30The algorithm is not part of Targonski (2011) but we received instructions and rules for the
algorithm from Joe Targonski in a personal email exchange. The algorithm basically identifies any
county (with absolute annual crime reports above 10) that report crimes only in March, June, September
and December (or a subset of those for (semi-)annually reporters), and zero crimes in all other months.
31In line with Targonski (2011) we ignore small negative values of at least -3. Those are usually




Not in NICS sample (BL1)
Not in UCR sample
Figure 14: States and counties represented in the NICS and UCR samples
Map of the United States showing the states contained in the NICS background check data and counties contained
in the cleaned UCR crime data. Red counties are located in NoDelay states. Blue counties are located in Delay
states. Shaded states are dropped in their entirety from the NICS sample. Dark grey counties are not present
in the UCR sample. Note that the NVSS sample covers all counties in all states apart from Michigan and
Connecticut.
A.5 Data Construction of Google Search Volume
Google search data is not available at an absolute level and always scaled on a 0-100
interval with respect to the maximum volume within the specified time and geographic
area. In order to circumvent this issue, we first queried relative searches for a given
expression like “gun store” across U.S. states from 01/01/2008 until 31/12/2016 and
divided the numbers by 100 to construct a pseudo-ranking of states. Next, we obtained
the relative monthly search volume for each state individually over the same time period
and divided again by 100. Multiplying the results from these two stages already offers a
coherent monthly state-panel for the relative search volume from 2008 until the end of
2016. In order to zoom further into the monthly variation, we then queried the relative
daily search volume for each state in 3 month intervals, re-scaled each month to a 0-100
interval and finally multiplied each month’s daily volumes with the state-month weights




B.1 Robustness and Sensitivity of Firearm Purchase Results
This section reports and discusses additional robustness and sensitivity checks for the
gun sale results in Section 5.1. In Table 11, we assess remaining concerns about
seasonality by running placebo regressions shifting both sample and treatment period
several years backward. Overall, the placebo regressions do not produce any significant
results. There appears to be a similar effect of even higher magnitude for the period
after the first Obama election in 2008 which is, however, far from statistical significance
at conventional levels.
In Table 12 we show how results would change for other plausible sample definitions.
Specifications 3 to 6 add the two states omitted from the baseline sample for other
reasons than outliers – Connecticut and Michigan. The coefficients remain stable. In
columns 7 and 8, we drop all states which featured at least one outlier value during
our baseline sample and obtain qualitatively similar results. Finally, columns 9 and
10 use the baseline sample definition of our homicide results which effectively adds all
NICS outlier values to the regression. While the estimates still have the expected sign,
they become very noisy and uninformative since we incorporate states with significant
measurement error in the outcome variable.
Figure 15 explores the sensitivity of our baseline findings with respect to the exclusion
of specific states. While showing rather similar coefficients throughout, the results seem
sensitive to the inclusion of Texas. The same analysis for the Delays ×Post2t coefficient
in Figure 16, however, reveals that the exclusion of Texas did not reduce the effect
but shifted it partly into the Post2 period. As argued in Section 3, the NICS data
is prone to substantial measurement error which can also happen temporally due to
delays in permit processing times. Excluding the most populous state in the control
group may thus have shifted the weights of the regression towards states suffering more
from this type of mis-measurement. In line with this argument, we do not observe such
attenuation in our gun homicide results in Figure 17, where measurement error of the
above kind can be ruled out.
Table 13 shows results when using the outcome variable in levels and/or applying
a within-transformation instead of seasonal differencing to account for time-invariant
heterogeneity. In virtually all specifications, our coefficient of interest remains highly
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significant. The only exception is when using logs in a standard within transformation
which seems to be doing a worse job than others at accounting for trends in the data.
Once these are included, the main coefficient turns significant and rises to a similar
magnitude as in the baseline specification.
Finally, Table 14 explores weighting by adult instead of total population or no
weighting at all. Adult population weights in specifications 3 and 4 leave the coefficients
almost unchanged. Using no weights, however, renders our main coefficient insignificant.
This shows that our effect is driven by more populated states.
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Table 11: Handgun background checks (placebo regressions)
∆12 Log of handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Baseline (2010-2013) -1 Year (2009-2012) -2 Years (2008-2011) Obama I (2006-2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delay×Post1 −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.001 0.025 −0.007 0.052 −0.174 −0.164
(0.044) (0.033) (0.029) (0.046) (0.020) (0.038) (0.119) (0.129)
Delay×Post2 0.010 0.007 0.033 0.050 −0.003 0.054 −0.030 −0.020
(0.064) (0.084) (0.054) (0.067) (0.055) (0.062) (0.057) (0.071)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
States 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Observations 1,516 1,516 1,525 1,525 1,540 1,540 1,548 1,548
R2 0.539 0.594 0.545 0.582 0.565 0.626 0.449 0.497
Notes: Observations are at the state-month-level. The sample period is November x−2 until October x+1, i.e.
an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after November of the year used as the event (x).
Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors
clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are
log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and
interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the state population.
Table 12: Handgun background checks (varying the sample)
∆12 Log of handgun sale background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
NICS data BL1 + CT BL1 + MI w/ BL1 - states Full NICS data
w/o outliers law change w/ NICS - CT&MI
- CT&MI (=BL1) outliers (=BL2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.083∗ −0.072∗∗−0.084∗ −0.081∗∗−0.079 −0.066∗∗−0.779 −0.790
(0.044) (0.033) (0.043) (0.032) (0.043) (0.033) (0.048) (0.034) (0.542) (0.521)
Delay×Post2 0.010 0.007 0.014 0.013 −0.000 −0.010 0.046 0.058 −0.375 −0.386
(0.064) (0.084) (0.064) (0.083) (0.065) (0.085) (0.058) (0.070) (0.310) (0.290)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
States 43 43 44 44 44 44 40 40 49 49
Observations 1,516 1,516 1,552 1,552 1,552 1,552 1,440 1,440 1,764 1,764
R2 0.539 0.594 0.535 0.591 0.545 0.598 0.577 0.622 0.261 0.433
Notes: Observations are at the state-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month























































































Figure 15: Post1 coefficients for background checks leaving out states
Bars represent coefficients for ∆12 Log handgun sale background checks after removing a single state (denoted on
the x-axis) from the sample and corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line indicates our baseline,


































































Figure 16: Post2 coefficients for background checks leaving out states
Bars represent coefficients for ∆12 Log handgun sale background checks after removing a single state (denoted on
the x-axis) from the sample and corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line indicates our baseline,
i.e. the magnitude when excluding no state.
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Table 13: Handgun background checks (logs and levels)
Handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Seasonal differencing (Baseline) Within transformation
Logs (Baseline) Levels Logs Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delay×Post1 −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗ −66.211∗∗∗ −55.313∗∗∗ −0.054 −0.107∗∗ −72.428∗∗ −68.820∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.033) (23.895) (19.723) (0.090) (0.045) (32.484) (22.516)
Delay×Post2 0.010 0.007 −14.166 −4.637 0.073 0.005 −8.818 −3.972
(0.064) (0.084) (18.522) (21.528) (0.079) (0.083) (18.992) (21.428)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
States 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Observations 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 2,047 2,047 2,047 2,047
Mean DV 0.194 0.194 44.999 44.999 5.860 5.860 213.573 213.573
R2 0.539 0.594 0.636 0.695 0.970 0.979 0.921 0.942
Notes: Observations are at the state-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month
FE. Regressions are weighted by the state population.
Table 14: Handgun background checks (different weights)
∆12 Log of handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Weights Population Adult population None
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delay×Post1 −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.030 −0.042
(0.044) (0.033) (0.044) (0.033) (0.042) (0.042)
Delay×Post2 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.004 −0.029 −0.055
(0.064) (0.084) (0.064) (0.084) (0.059) (0.081)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y
States 43 43 43 43 43 43
Observations 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516
R2 0.539 0.594 0.538 0.593 0.561 0.608
Notes: Observations are at the state-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month
FE. Weights change according to the specification.
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B.2 Robustness and Sensitivity of Homicide Results
We discuss further further robustness and sensitivity checks of our homicide results in
Section 6.1. In Table 15, we run placebo regressions similar to those in Section B.1
where we pre-date our sample and treatment periods. Coefficients in other years are
closer to zero and insignificant throughout, suggesting that the previously uncovered
effect of delay laws on handgun-related homicides can only be observed during this
specific treatment period. Pre-dating by 2 years, yields a rather high coefficient. This,
however, seems to depend strongly on the inclusion of linear trends and is insignificant
at all conventional levels.
Appendix Table 16 shows that our results hold for different sample definitions, such
as including Connecticut or Michigan and using only the 43 states and dates with reliable
background check data as in our baseline regressions on firearm purchases in Section 5.1.
Also the exclusion of single states reported in Figure 17 does not seem to strongly affect
our estimates. The inclusion of California, however, seems to attenuate our estimates.
Concerns about functional form and data transformation are addressed in Table 17.
Results in levels are of very similar magnitude but become insignificant when adding
trends. Using within-transformation leads to slightly larger, highly significant results
throughout. In Table 18 we explore whether using adult population or using no weights
affects our results. Consistent with Table 14, we find that adult population leaves the
estimates unchanged while using no weights removes the entire effect. As for our firearm
purchase results, also our homicide results are thus driven by more populated areas.
Finally, Table 19 uses NVSS data collapsed at the state-month level. Despite a severe
drop in sample size from 109,692 to 1,764 observations and reduced statistical power,
our results remain significant. The estimates are slightly higher in magnitude, which is
likely due to imperfectly accounting for county heterogeneity.
56
Table 15: Placebo regressions of homicide rates
∆12 Log of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Baseline (2010-2013) -1 Year (2009-2012) -2 Years (2008-2011) Obama I (2006-2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.001 −0.007 −0.008 −0.014 −0.004 −0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 −0.008 −0.014 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.015) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.009 0.021 0.044 0.056
Notes: All regressions use 109,692 observations from 3,047 counties. The sample period is November x − 2
until October x + 1, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after November of the
year used as the event (x). Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in
November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Included control variables are log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All
variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
Table 16: Handgun homicide rates (varying the sample)
∆12 Log of handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Full NVSS data BL2 + CT BL2 + MI w/ BL2 - states NVSS data
- CT&MI law change w/ NICS w/o NICS outliers
(=BL2) outliers - CT&MI (=BL1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.019∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.017∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.020∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.018∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 −0.019 −0.017 −0.016 −0.012 −0.019 −0.016 −0.018 −0.015
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Counties 3,047 3,047 3,055 3,055 3,130 3,130 2,823 2,823 3,047 3,047
Observations 109,692 109,692 109,980 109,980 112,680 112,680 101,628 101,628 106,414 106,414
R2 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019
Notes: Observations are at the county-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month






























































































Figure 17: Post1 coefficients on homicide leaving out states
Bars represent coefficients for ∆12 Log handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants after removing a single state
(denoted on the x-axis) from the sample and corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line indicates
our baseline, i.e. the magnitude when excluding no state.
Table 17: Homicide rates (logs and levels)
Handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Seasonal differencing (Baseline) Within transformation
Logs (Baseline) Levels Logs Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.017 −0.034∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 −0.019 −0.015 −0.012 −0.011 −0.012 −0.008
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
Counties 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047
Observations 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 146,256 146,256 146,256 146,256
Mean DV 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.245 0.245 0.287 0.287
R2 0.008 0.019 0.005 0.015 0.478 0.491 0.334 0.350
Notes: Observations are at the county-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month
FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
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Table 18: Homicide rates (different weights)
∆12 Log of handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Weights Population Adult population None
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗ 0.003 0.005
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 −0.017 −0.014 −0.014∗ −0.011
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y
Counties 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047
Observations 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692
R2 0.008 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.002 0.012
Notes: Observations are at the county-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month
FE. Weights change according to the specification.
Table 19: Homicide rates (state level)
∆12 Log of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Handgun Any Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Delay×Post1 −0.023∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.026∗ −0.027 −0.003 −0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.014)
Delay×Post2 −0.014 −0.015 −0.017 0.004 0.003 0.020∗ 0.021
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.011) (0.014)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N N Y N Y N Y
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Observations 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764
R2 0.036 0.150 0.162 0.134 0.145 0.135 0.143
Notes: Observations are at the state-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month
FE. Regressions are weighted by the state population.
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B.3 The Effect of Delay Laws on Suicides and Accidents
In addition to homicides, the comparatively smaller increase in handgun ownership in
Delay states may also have affected suicides and accidents involving a handgun which
we discuss in this section. In Table 20 we use our baseline specification to create
corresponding estimates for suicides and accidents. For accidents we find an insignificant
and small relative increase in overall incidents in columns 1 and 2 while those related
to a handgun in specifications 3 and 4 show no response. This does not fully support
the findings of Levine and McKnight (2017) who report that gun-related fatal accidents
strongly increased in relative terms after the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School.
While our study differs along a few dimensions, including the fact that we use county-
level data and a slightly different treatment period, we do not think that these are the
primary drivers for the observed differences across the two studies. Instead, a more likely
explanation could be our use of handgun purchase delay laws instead of the 2012 Obama
vote share as a shifter for the reaction in firearm sales. Our results thus indicate that
the effects are not robust to this different, and in our view more credible, identification
strategy.32
Columns 7 to 12 show the reaction of suicide rates. Importantly, those related
to handguns do not show a significant reaction but are negative and thus point in
the expected direction. Our findings are thus qualitatively in line with prior research
which has argued that having a gun in the home is positively associated with suicide by
firearm (Anglemyer, Horvath, and Rutherford, 2014). Concerning the size and lack of
significance in columns 9 and 10, one has to bear in mind that our time window used is
relatively small and only if a person is both suicidal and in the possession of a gun would
a firearm-related suicide occur.33 Furthermore, medical research by Klonsky and May
(2015) has failed to establish a relationship between impulsiveness and the tendency to
act on suicidal thoughts, lending further corroboration to the idea that suicides should
not react to the shock to a similar extent. Having said that, it seems plausible that
additional suicides may materialize after a longer time period. It also seems unlikely
that a person with suicidal thoughts would purchase a firearm due to the gun demand
32Section 5.3 shows that differences across Delay and NoDelay states only arise in handgun sales, not
in the intention to purchase a firearm. We deem it unlikely to be the case for the 2012 Obama vote
share to a similar extent.
33The two most prominent studies studying the relationship of firearm ownership and suicides,
Edwards et al. (2018) and Lang (2013), utilize annual data and investigate substantially longer time
horizons of several years.
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Table 20: Accidents and suicides
∆12 Log of mortality rate per 100,000 inhabitants
Accidents Suicides
Any Handgun Other Any Handgun Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Delay×Post1 0.011 0.008 −0.000 −0.000 0.012 0.009 −0.008 0.004 −0.014 −0.004 0.002 0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Delay×Post2 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.013 0.003 0.013 −0.000 0.005
(0.015) (0.019) (0.002) (0.003) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.004 0.016 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.016 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.013
Notes: All regressions use 109,692 observations from 3,047 counties. The sample period is November 2010
until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election.
Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors
clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are
log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and
interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
shock where the primary motive was an increased perception of needing firearms for

















































































































































Delay states NoDelay states
Figure 18: Background checks for handguns in Delay vs NoDelay states (levels)
Monthly NICS handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants in Delay states and NoDelay states between
November 2009 and October 2013. The sample encompasses data for all states consistently included in our main
specification. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012










































































































































Delay states NoDelay states
Figure 19: Homicide rate in Delay vs NoDelay states (levels)
Monthly homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Delay states and NoDelay states between November 2009 and
October 2013. The sample encompasses data from all counties consistently included in our main specification.
The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013.


























































































































p Delay states NoDelay states
Figure 20: Background check rate for handguns in Delay vs NoDelay states (growth
rate)
Growth rate of monthly NICS handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants in Delay states and NoDelay
states between November 2009 and October 2013. The sample encompasses data for all states consistently
included in our main specification. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months after the 2012
election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period for preceding

















































































































Delay states NoDelay states
Figure 21: Homicide rate in Delay vs NoDelay states (growth rate)
Growth rate of monthly homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in Delay states and NoDelay states between November
2009 and October 2013. The sample encompasses data from all counties consistently included in our main
specification. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012
to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas are marking the same period for preceding years. For better visibility,
















































































































































































































' Delay states NoDelay states
Figure 22: Log Google searches for “gun store” in Delay vs NoDelay states
Log weekly averages of daily normalized Google searches for the expression “gun store” in Delay states and
NoDelay states between November 2009 and October 2013. The sample encompasses data for all states
consistently included in our main specification. The dark grey-shaded area includes the first six months after
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Effect of Delay state
on Growth rate non-handgun homicides per 100,000 pop
Figure 23: Event study graph for non-handgun homicide rate
Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of being in a Delay state on ∆12 Log non-handgun homicide
per 100,000 inhabitants for each month between November 2010 and October 2013. The dark grey-shaded area
includes the first six months after the 2012 election, i.e. November 2012 to April 2013. Light grey-shaded areas
are marking the same period for preceding years.
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Table 21: Google searches for “gun store” (logs and levels)
Standardized share of Google searches for “gun store”
Seasonal differencing (Baseline) Within transformation
Logs (Baseline) Levels Logs Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delay×Post1 0.037 −0.017 −1.046 −0.024 −0.283 0.035 −8.376 −2.459
(0.082) (0.090) (3.611) (2.605) (0.181) (0.073) (7.763) (3.848)
Delay×Post2 −0.027 −0.081 0.667 1.689 −0.353∗∗ −0.035 −5.371 0.546
(0.097) (0.133) (2.386) (3.627) (0.173) (0.112) (4.509) (2.267)
Year-Week FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Observations 7,693 7,693 7,693 7,693 7,693 7,693 7,693 7,693
R2 0.230 0.247 0.419 0.441 0.511 0.665 0.440 0.802
Notes: Observations are at the state-week-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013,
i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal
differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), %
rural, % below poverty line, % blacks, % hispanics and % with internet access. All variables are as of 2010
and interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the state population.
Table 22: Handgun sale transaction costs
∆12 Log of handgun background checks per 100,000 inhabitants
Threshold X=... 1st Quartile ($47) 2nd Quartile ($67) 3rd Quartile ($115)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Delay×Post1 −0.081∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.078∗ −0.070∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.072∗∗
(0.044) (0.033) (0.044) (0.031) (0.045) (0.032) (0.044) (0.033)
Delay×Post2 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.003 −0.036 −0.062 0.002 −0.004
(0.064) (0.084) (0.063) (0.083) (0.067) (0.097) (0.057) (0.076)
(Tr. Costs>X)×Post1 0.072 0.081 0.068∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.003
(0.045) (0.053) (0.028) (0.034) (0.019) (0.033)
(Tr. Costs>X)×Post2 −0.142 −0.147 0.145 0.202∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.161) (0.088) (0.109) (0.058) (0.057)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.539 0.594 0.543 0.599 0.554 0.615 0.554 0.611
Notes: All regressions use 1,516 observations from 43 states. Observations are at the state-month-level. The
sample period is November 2010 until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and
1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in
November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Included control variables are log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All
variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the state population.
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Table 23: Effect on homicide rates: victim age
∆12 Log of handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Victim age Any < 10 10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 ≥ 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗−0.019∗∗ −0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 −0.017∗∗∗−0.014∗∗ 0.001 −0.002 −0.004 −0.005 −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.003
(0.008) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 0.001 0.002 −0.009∗ −0.009 −0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 −0.005 −0.006 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004
(0.015) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.021 0.012 0.023 0.006 0.016 0.006 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.004 0.013
Notes: All regressions use 109,692 observations from 3,047 counties. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years
before and 1 year after the 2012 election. Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the
state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All
variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
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Table 24: Effect on homicide rates: victim race
∆12 Log of handgun homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Victim race Any White Black Hispanic Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Delay×Post1 −0.022∗∗∗−0.019∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.012∗ −0.014 −0.009 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Delay×Post2 −0.018 −0.015 −0.002 −0.003 −0.008 −0.004 −0.006 −0.007 −0.004 −0.004
(0.015) (0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
R2 0.008 0.019 0.003 0.012 0.009 0.021 0.014 0.022 0.007 0.018
Notes: All regressions use 109,692 observations from 3,047 counties. The sample period is November 2010
until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election.
Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors
clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included control variables are
log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and
interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county population.
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Table 25: UCR/FBI Homicide Reports: comparability
∆12 Log of murders per 100,000 inhabitants
UCR NVSS (UCR sample) NVSS (full sample)
Handgun Any Other Handgun Any Other Handgun Any Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Delay×Post1 −0.014 −0.013 −0.017 −0.016 −0.001 0.000 −0.019∗∗ −0.017 −0.023∗ −0.022 −0.003 −0.003 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.021 −0.002 −0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
Delay×Post2 0.003 0.004 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.019 −0.016 −0.014 0.003 0.004 0.022∗ 0.021 −0.018 −0.015 0.002 0.005 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.031) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011)
Year-Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
County Trends N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Counties 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 2,229 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047 3,047
Observations 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 80,244 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692 109,692
R2 0.010 0.021 0.009 0.019 0.008 0.019 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.015 0.008 0.019 0.006 0.016 0.005 0.014
Notes: Observations are at the county-month-level. The sample period is November 2010 until October 2013, i.e. an asymmetric 36-month window 2 years before and 1 year after the 2012 election.
Where no seasonal differencing is applied, the nominal sample period starts in November 2009. Standard errors clustered at the state-level are in parentheses: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Included
control variables are log(population), % rural, % below poverty line, % blacks and % hispanics. All variables are as of 2010 and interacted with Month FE. Regressions are weighted by the county
population.
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